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Economic  downturns  not  associated  with  famine  appear  to have
little short-term  impact  on mortality.  Famines,  whether  associ-
ated with major economic  downturns  or not, appear to have
major short-term  effects  on mortality.
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The links  between  economic  and  demographic  change,  both long  run  and  short
run,  are of central  i  erest  to policy  development.  The clear  division  of the
world  in  the  1950s  ana  i960s  into  rich  countries  with  low  fertility  and  mortality
and poor countries  with high fertility  and mortality  was used as support  for
strongly-held  views that economic  development  was a necessary  precursor  of
demographic  change  (particularly  mortality  decline)  and  that  demographic  change
(particularly  fertility decline) was  a  necessary condition of  economic
development.  In the more recent  past, a number  of developing  countries  have
achieved low fertility and mortality levels despite less than impressive
improvements  in economic  development  (Sri Lanka  and Cuba are obvious  cases).
However,  as shown by Preston (1980,  1985) the cross-sectional  relationship
between  mortality  and per capita  income  has remained  strong,  even though  the
relationship  has  shifted  over  time  towards  a  lower  level  of  mortality  for  a  given
level  of  per  capita  income.  Similar  changes  have  taken  place  in  the  relationship
between  fertility  and economic  indices,  as shown  on a cross-sectional  basis  by
the  World  Bank 1984  World  Development  Report  study (World  Bank;  1985).
The  cross-sectional  relationships  between mortality or  fertility and
indicators  of economic  development  have  been  used  to argue  both  for  and  against
national  or international  health  or family  planning  interventions.  The strong
relationships  are taken  to indicate  that only economic  advancement  will alter
demographic  rates  substantially;  the  changing  relationships  are  taken  to  indicate
that interventions  can  and  do alter  the  demographic  rates  independently  of the
economic  indicators.  Rather  different  concerns  arose  in  the  late  1970s  and  early
1980s  about  whether  demographic  changes  (specifically  declines  in  fertility  and
mortality)  were slowing down prematurely,  a process often characterized  as
'stalling'  (see  Gwatkin;1980  for  mortality  and  Gendell;1984  for  fertility).  In
the  late  1980s,  the  concerns  changed  again,  to the  adverse  mortality  effects  of
the third  world debt crisis  and recession,  and of the macroeconomic  policies
introduced  to remedy  such situations  (Cornia  and  Jolly;1987).
The  policy  issues  have  thus  recently  become  increasingly  concerned  with  the
short  run:  to  what  extent  do  short-run  economic  fluctuations  result  in  short-run
demographic  fluctuations.  The object  of this  paper is to  examine  this  question
2with special  reference  to the possible  mortality  effects  of the third  world
economic  crisis of the 1980s.  However,  because the question  is difficult to
answer  using recent  data only, the historical  record  will also be examined,
working  backwards  from the recent  past to periods  pre-dating  the demographic
transition.
Demograghic  Response  to Economic  Fluctuations  in the  1980s
Across the developing  world,  the 1980s  have been characterized  by debt
crisis, recession and concomitant  macroeconomic  adjustment  policies, often
introduced in collaboration  with  international  organizations  such as the
International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  World  Bank.  The _m,4pact  of such  developments
has in fact  been quite  uneven,  much stronger  in Latin  America  and sub-Saharan
Africa than in Asia. Cornia  et al. (1987)  have argued that the effects on
government  expenditures  and  household  incomes  of  adjustment  policies  have slowed
mortality declines or contributed  to mortality increases in much  of the
developing  world.  Their  arguments  are  based  largely  on  observed  cross-sectional
relations between development  and  mortality and  on  limited empirical or
impressionistic  data  for  a  small  number  of  case  studies.  However,  in  a review  of
measures  of child mortality for countries  with data that satisfy specified
quality  standards,  Hill  and  Pebley  (1989)  find  no  evidence  of  any  slowdown  in  the
rate of decline  in childhood  mortality  in the 1970s  or 1980s  except  for some
decrease in the absolute  decline in child mortality in Asia, where child
mortality  has reached  low  enough  levels  for constant  absolute  declines  to be
impossible  and  where  the impact  of the  1980s  rec-srion  has  been least.
Though  Hill  and  Pebley  find  no evidence  of a  slowdown  in the  rate  of child
mortality  decline,  they recognize  that, for a number  of reasons,  it is not
possible  therefore  to  conclude  that  the  economic  recession  has  had  no effect  on
child  mortality.  The reasons  why sv:ch  a conclusion  cannot  at prevent  be drawn
from  the  recent  empirical  record  are  as follows.  First,  the  number  of countries
for which  recent estimates of  child mortality are  available is  small,
particularly  for sub-Saharan  Africa. The countries  for which estimates  are
available  may not be representative  of all countries  and thus of overall
experiernce.  Second,  child  mortality  declines  may  have  continued  during  the  1980s
3despite  adverse  economic  conditions  because  of the  widespread  introduction  .
immunization  programs,  oral rehydration  therapy  and other  elements  of primary
health  care.  Third,  the  mortality  response  to an economic  shock  may  be lagged,
so that  effects  may only  become  visible  some  years  in  the future.
All  these  reasons  argue  for  an  examination  of the  historical  record,  which
is less  affected  by selection  effects,  is not  contaminated  by the  simultaneous
introduction  of  child  survival  programs,  and  allows  careful  examination  for  lags.
The  sectiod-s  that  follow  examine  relationships  between  demographic  variables  and
economic  indicators  for individual  countries  and  for  other  broad  recessions.
The  Case  of Chile.  1967^87
Chile is an interesting  case study  because it has suffered  a  niumber  of
economic jolts over the last three decades and has excellent demographic
statistics.  Structural  adjustment  style  policies  of  fiscal  restraint,  tight  money
and exchange  rate  devaluation  were introduced  in 1974  after the  Pinochet  coup
d'etat,  and  a further  sharp  downturn  in  the  economy  occurred  in  1982,  coinciding
with the  debt crisis  recession.
Taucher (1989) has  analyzed the  relationships  between economic and
demographic  indicators  in  Chile  over  the  period  1967  to 1987.  Using real gross
domestic  income  per  capita  as the  economic  index,  and a range  of indicators  of
nuptiality,  fertility  and  mortality,  Taucher  concluded  that  marriage  rates  and  K
fertility  for  first,  second  and  third,  but  not  higher  order,  births  were  strongly
associated  with economic  fluctuations,  particularly  with lags of zero and one
year,  whereas  infant  mortality  (and  its  neonatal  and  post-neonatal  components),
adult  mortality  and fertility  above  birth  order  three  were only  weakly, if at
all,  associated  with economic  change.
Some  of  the  variables  in  Taucher's  analysis  show  an  essentially  flat  secular
trend (for  example,  the total  marriage  rate and fertility  up to birth order
three)  whereas others show strong  secular trends (notably  infant  mortality,
fertility  beyond  birth  order  three,  and  younger  adult  mortality).  In  order  to  get
a  clearer  picture  of fluctuations  as  opposed  to  trends,  Taucher's  data  have  been
de-trended  using  11  year  moving  averages.  For  each  variable,  the  ratios  of the
observed  values to the 11-year moving average have been regressed on the
4corresponding  ratios  of  GDI  per  capita,  with  lags  of  zero,  one  and  two  years.  The
results  of these  models  are shown  in Table  1. A negative  relationship  between
infar.t  morttlity  'and  partiLularly  post-neonatal  infant  mortality?  and  per  capita
GDI lagged  by one year approaches  significance  at the five percent level,
suggesting  that  there  is  some  child  mortality  response  to  economic  crisis.  Both
fertility  variables  show  a positive  relationship  with GDI  per capita  lagged  by
two years, whereas the  total marriage rate shows an  immediate positive
relationship. The  adult  mortality  relationships show  few  significant
relationships,  though male and female  mortality over age 65 is negatively
associated  with per capita  income  lagged  by one  year (significant  at the five
percent  level  for  females,  and  ten  percent  level  for  males),  and  ftmale  mortality
at  ages  45 to  64  and  65  plus  is  positively  associated  witll  zero-lagged  per  capita
income.  Taucher examined  age-standardized  cause-specific  mortality rates for
adults  from  1975  to  1985.  Although  she  found  no  significant  relationships  between
such  rates  and  per  capita  income,  deaths  from  tuberculosis  showed  trend-reversing
increases  in  1976  and  1982-83,  one  year after  each  major  economic  downturn,  and
deaths  from  cirrhosis  were  negatively  correlated  with  per capita  income  lagged
by one  and two  years.
Taucher  accounts  for  her  finding  of  a  lack  of  a strong  relationship  between
infant  mortality  and  economic  performance  in  terms  of  a  number  of  countervailing
factors  operating  during  the  period.  Existing  social  programs  were targeted  at
maternal  and child  health  during  the recession.  The educational  level of the
population  was improving,  as was the proportion  with piped water supply.  The
structure  of fertility  was also changing  as fertility  declined,  with a sharp
reduction  in higher order births. Taucher (1988)  has explained  part of the
apparent  lack of response  of infant  mortality  to economic  crisis in Chile  in
terms  of short-rim  changes  in  the  composition  of  births  by social  class,  whereby
the  poor (with  high in:?.ant  mortality)  reduced  their  fertility  by more  than the
better-off  (with  low infant  mortality),  such that overall  infant  mortality,  a
weighted  average  across  both  classes,  could  decline  even  though  infant  mortality
within  both  categories  could  have increased.  Assuming  that  the  poor  have  higher
fertility,  and thus  contribute  disproportionately  to higher-order  births, the
data  suggest  the  opposite  effect.  The  proportion  of births  that  were
5Table  1:  Regression  Coefficients  (Elasticities)  of Demographic  Fluctuations
on Per  Capita  Income  Fluctu4zions:  tThile,  1966-1987
Demographic  Gross  Domestic  Income  Per  Cauita  Constant Adjusted
Variable  Lag 0  Lag 1  Lag  2  R
Infant  Mortality
Rate  0.091 (0.68) -0.654  (0.06)  0.316  (0.26)  1,22  0.37
Neonatal  Mortality
Rate  0.099 (0.67) -0.418  (0.22)  0.131  (0.64)  1.19  0.03
Post-Neonatal  Mortality
Rate  0.075 (0.79) -0.841  (0.06)  0.460 (0.19)  1.26  0.40
Cumulative  Fertility,  Birth
Orders  1-3  0.050 (.39)  0.130  (0.13)  0.305 (0.00)  0.51  0.92
Cumulative  Fertility,  Birth
Orders  4+  -0.147  (0.25)  0.124 (0.46)  0.483  (0.01)  0.48  0.82
Proportion  of All Births  of
Order  1  0.155 (0.05) -0.024  (0.79) -0.166  (0.07)  1.05  0.70
Proportion  of  All Births  of
Order  4+  -0.201  (0.04) -0.042  (0.70)  0.210 (0.06)  1.00  0.71
Total  Marriage
Rate  0.333 (0.04)  0.086 (0.60)  0.141  (0.37)  0.43  0.69
Male  Mortality  Index,
Ages 25-44  0.802 (0.12) -0.384  (0.52)  0.289  (0.54)  0.27  0.20
Male Mortality  Index,
Ages 45-64  0.170  (0.21) -0.127  (0.45) -0.167  (0.23)  1.10  0.49
Male  Mortality  Rate,
Ages 65+  0.218 (0.18) -0.454  (0.07)  0.278 (0.12)  0.96  0.34
Female  Mortality  Index,
Ages 25-44  0.135 (0.42) -0.158  (0.48)  0.130  (0.45)  -. 7  0.00
Female  Mortality  Index,
Ages  45-64  0.293 (0.03) -0.282  (0.08)  0.016 (0.88)  0.96  0.62
Female  Mortality  Rate
Ages 65+  0.364 (0.05) -0.599  (0.03)  0.387 (0.06)  0.82  0.53
Annual  observations  are  deviations  from  detrended  series.
Values  in  parenthesis  are  probability  values.
6first  births  shows  a  positive  relation  with  unlagged  per  capita  income  (and
then a negative  relation  with per capita  income  lagged  by two years,  a
possible  'echo'  effect),  whereas  the  proportion  of  births  that  were  of  orders
four  or  higher  shows  a  negative  relation  with  unlagged  per  capita  income  (and
then  a positive  relation  with  per  capita  income  lagged  by two  years,  again
possibly  an  'echo'  effect).
The  re-analysis  of  Taucher's  data  using  detrended  series  confirms  several
of  her  findings.  A  positive  relationship  is  found  between  the  total  marriage
rate  and  per  capita  income  in  the  same  year,  and  between  cumulative  fertility
for  birth  orders  one  to  three  and  per  capita  income,  though  primarily  at  a  lag
of  two  years  rather  than  one.  However,  the  detrended  series  shows  a  positive
relationship  between  the  total  fertility  for  birth  orders  four  and  over  and
per  capita  income  lagged  by  two  years,  and  suggests  a  negative  relationship,
significant  at  the  ten  percent  level,  between  both  the  infant  mortality  rate
and  the  post-neonatal  mortality  rate  and  per  capita  income  lagged  by  one  year.
The  magnitude  of  this  effect  is  substantial,  with  an  elasticity  of  close  to
one, but it may be partly  a birth order  effect  (putting  the unlagged
proportions  of  first  births  and  fourth  plus  births  into  a  model  relating  the
infant  mortality  rate  (or  the  post-neonatal  mortality  rate)  to  per capita
income  lagged  by one  year  reduces  the  significance  and  absolute  coefficient
size  of  all  the  variables).
In summary,  the Chile example  shows a  significant  fertility  and
nuptiality  response  to  economic  crisis,  and  suggests  possible  infant  mortality
and  mortality  over  age 65 responses.  These  responses  are in the  expected
directions  (a negative  effect  of crisis  on nuptiality  and fertility,  a
positive  effect  of crisis  on mortality)  and  have  plausible  lags  (zero  for
nuptiality,  one  year  for  infant  and  old  age  mortality,  two  years  for  low  and
high  birth  order  fertility).  One  apparently  implausible  relation  is  found,  a
negative  relationship  with  no  lag  between  crisis  and  older  female  mortality.
The  Case  of  China.  1955-65
The  case  of  China  in  the  late  1950s  and  early  1960s  is  the  most  dramatic
well-documented  recent  example  of  sharp  demographic  responses  to  economic  or
social  crisis  (Ashton  et  al.,1984).  From  the  mid-1950s  to  around  1960,  the
birth  rate  fell  by  one  half,  the  death  rate  increased  by  about  50  percent,  and
the  infant  mortality  rate  almost  doubled.  This  demographic  crisis  coincided
with  the  Great  Leap  Forward,  launched  in 1958.  The  proximate  -suse  of the
crisis  appears  to  have  been  widespread  famine:  foodgrain  production  fell  in
1960  to only  seventy  percent  of its  1958  level,  and  per capita  daily  food
energy  dropped  by a similar  amount.  The famine  in turn resulted  from  a
combination  of factors  - inappropriate  agricultural  policies,  overly  rapid
7urbanization  associated  with  the  Great  Leap,  climatic  disasters,  and  a  failure
to compensate  for  grain  shortages  through  international  trade.
The economic  data for  China  are  not adequate  to study  the  crisis  period
in detuil. However, certain demographic  features  of  the crisis can be
examined.  Feeney and Yu (1987)  have calculated  period parity progression
ratios'  from 1955 to 1981. The progression  to first marriage  was hardly
affected  by the  crisis,  the  largest  effect  being  a reduction  of less  then  two
percent  in  1959.  All  the  parity  progressions  reached  minima  in  1961,  the  drops
being  largest  for  the  highest  order  births;  progredsion  from  marriage  to  first
birth  dropped  from  a pre-crisis  level  around  97 percent  to around  80  percent,
whereas progression  from sixth to siventh  births dropped from around 90
percent to only 55 percent.  The two facts that parity-specific  fertility
control  was rare  in  China  prior  to the  1960s  and  that  the  progression  to first
marriage  was little  affected  by the  crisis  suggest  that  fertility  fell  through
a  physiological  reduction  in  conception  rates  (reduced  fecundability,  reduced
libido,  or possibly  voluntary  abstinence)  or through  an increase  in fetal
loss,  whether  spontaneous  or otherwise.
The  mortality  effects  estimated  by Ashton  et al.  show  large  increases  in
infant  mortality,  to  levels  80  percent  higher  than  previously,  in  three  of the
four  years  of the  crisis  period,  but suggest  more than a doubling  of deaths
over age 10 in two of the four years.  The mortality  impact  of the crisis,
though  severe  on the  young,  was  many  times  more severe  on the  population,  and
particularly  the  male  population,  over  age  60.
The crisis  in China  was primarily  one  of famine  rather  than one  of the
overall economy, though in part the famine came abouit  as a  result of
inappropriate  economic  policies,  and  the  famine  undoubtedly  had  major  economic
effects.  The  crisis  affected  fertility  and  mortality,  but  had little  impact  on
nuptiality.  The  effects  on  mortality  were  particularly  pronounced  for  elderly
males,  though  elderly  females  and  young  children  also  faced  greatly  increased
mortality  risks.
The DemograRhic  Effects  of the  Great  Depression  in  Developing  Countries
The 'gr-at'  depression  of the 1930s  tr-eceded  major declines  in either
fertility  or  mortality  in  the  developing  wo4ld.  The  demographic  effects  of  the
depression  should thus be somewhat  easier  to detect than such effects of
recent  economic  changes,  because  of the  absence  of changes  brought  about  by
other factors.  The difficulty  of such  studies  of the  developing  world is the
' A  period  parity progression ratio  represents the  probability of
progressing  from  one parity  to the  next,  for example  from  having  one  child to
having  two,  calculated  for  a  particular  time  period,  in  this  case  a  year,  across
all  durations  of exposure.
8shortaae  of  data:  only  a handful  of  developing  count:ies  have  registration
data  on  vital  rates  accurate  enough  to  trace  short  rur.  fluctuations  with  any
accuracy.  In  order  to  increase  the  number  of  cases  studied,  an  alternative
source  of  data  has  been  developed.
Demographic  Fluctuations,  Age  Distributions  and  Growth  Rates
One  type  of  information  that  contains  information  about  past  demographic
fluctuations  and  is  available  for  a large  number  of  developing  countries  is
the age distribution.  Certain  types  of demographic  fluctuation,  notably
changes  in  the  birth  rate  or  in  child  mortality,  leave  evidence  of  themselves
behind  in  population  age  distributions.  For  example,  a  decrease  in  the  birth
rate  implies  a lower  than  normal  number  of  births  In  a given  -erioi,  and,
other  things  being  equal,  a  small  cohort  boni  in  the  period  at  ali  subsequent
observations  of the  population,  until  such  time  as the  cohort  becomes  so
attenuated  by  mortality  that  its  initial  smallness  is  no  longer  perceptible.
An increase  in  mortality  in  a period  -. as  a similar  effect;  because  child
mortality  rates  are  much  higher  than  mortality  rates  at  older  ages  until  late
adulthood,  an increase  in  mortality  typically  has a much more  pronounced
effect  on  the  numbers  of  young  children  than  on  any  other  age  group  up  to  late
adulthood.  Thus  fertility  or  mortality  fluctuations  should  be perceptible  in
population  age  distributions  for  at  least  fifty  years  thereafter.  Population
censuses  in  many  countries  of the  developing  world  from  the  1950s  onwards
provide  is with numerous  age distributions  to examine  for evidence  of
systematic  demographic  fluctuations  earlier  in the  century.  Unfortunately,
such  age  disttibutions  are  often  distorted  by errors,  particularly  of age
reporting  and  coverage.  A  procedure  that  limits  the  effects  of  such  errors  is
described  below.  It  is  very  similar  to,  though  more  flexible  than,  a  method
proposed  by  Ntozi  (1988)  based  on  age  ratios.
Let us assume  that  each country  has an underlying  population  age
structure  that is smooth  and unchanging  over time.  In this smooth  age
structure,  the  proportion  of the  population  aged  a is ska).  The true  age
distribution  is  like  the  underlying  smooth  one,  except  that  it  has  superficial
irregularities  arising  from  demographic  fluctuations  in the  past.  The true
proportion  of  the  population  aged  a  at  time  t,  p(a,t),  is  given  by  the  smooth
proportion,  s(a),  multiplied  by  a  factor  S(t-a)  characteristic  of  the  period
of  birth  of  the  cohort.
The reported  age distribution  is disto 4  d in two  ways.  First,  the
proportion  of  persons  of  age  a  is  distorted  by  an  age-specific  error  *(a)  that
does  not  change  over  time.  Thus  the  reported  proportion  of  the  population  aged
a  at  time  t,  po(a,t),  is  given  by
po(a,t)  - a(a)p(a,t)  - a(a)S(t-a)s(a)
9Second, the  census at  time t  records a  proportion 1(t) of  the  total
population,  a  proportion  that  is  constant  across  all  ages  a. Thus if  the  true
population  at tine t is  TP(t).  and the observed  total  population  is TPO(),
then
TPO(t)  - 8(t)TP(t)
We can  now  write the  obsetved  population  aged  a at time  t, PO(a,t),  as
PO(a,t) - 9(t)TP(t)a(a)6(t-a)s(a)
Similarly,  the  observed  population  aged  a at time  t+n, the  next census,  is
PO(a,t+n) - £(t+n)TP(t+n)a(a)6(t+r,-a)s(a)
The observed  growth  rate in the population  aged a between times  t and t+n,  X
ro(a,t:t+n),  can then  be calculated  as
ro(a,t:t+n) - (l/n]ln(1(t+n)TP(t+n)a(a)6(t+n-a)s(a)/
fi(t)TP(t)a(a)6(t-a)s(a))
- fl/n]ln(1(t+n)TP(t+n)/L(t)TP(t))  +
tl/n]ln(6(t+n-a)/6(t-a))
- ro(TPO,t:t+n)  + (l/n]ln(6(t+n-a)/6(t-a))
Thus
6(t+n-a)/6(t-a)  - exp[n(ro(a,t:t+n)  - ro(TPO,t:t+n))  (1)
That is, the ratio of deviations  from the smooth  underlying  pattern is a
function  of the  difference  between  the  appropriatv  age-specific  growth  rate
and the  growth  rate  of the  total  population.
The  right  hand  side  of equation  1 is  easy  to  calculate,  but  an iterative  K
procedure  is  required  to  obtain  period-specific  estimates  of  S.  Using  age  data
classified  by five year age groups,  two sets of estimates  are obtained  by
assumi..g  first that each right  hand side value in  equation  1 is equal to
6(t-:n-a),  that is, that 6(t-a)  equals  1.0, and ther second  that each right
hand side value is equal to l.0/6(t-a),  that is, that  6(t+n-a)  is equal to
1.0.  The  two  series  are  then  averaged  to obtain  a first  series  of  estimates  of
6, 6',  for  both.  t+n-a  and  t-a.  These  6'  values  are  then  used in equation  1  to
obtain  two  more sets of estimates,  one of 6(t+n-a)  and the  other  of 6(t-a),
which  are  in  turn  averaged  to  estimate  a second  series  of  estimates  of  6, 6''.
The iteration  continues  until  the values  of 5 stabilize.  In practice,  only
small  further  changes  take  place  after  ten  or so iterations.
Age-specific  growth  rates  have  limitations  as  a  source  of information.  If
calculated  for  five-year  age  groups,  they  can  merely  indicate  the  approximate
time location  and magnitude  of past demographic  fluctuations.  They cannot
distinguish  between  fertility  and  mortality  effects.  In  real  populations,  they
may also be effected  by international  migration,  though  such migration is
generally small by comparison  with fertility and mortality and  is also
unlikely  to  be concentrated  in  particular  birth  cohorts.  Some  residual  effects
of  age  misreporting,  and  particularly  of  changing  age  misreporting  over time,
10may also  distort  patterns.  However,  age-specific  growth  rates  can  be used to
identify  common  patterns  over  a large  number  of countries.  These  patterns  can
then  be further  elucidated  by the  study  of the  small  number  of countries  with
more extensive  data.
Calculating  Age-Specific  Growth  Rate Fluctuations
The  deviations  of  age-spec.ific  growth  rates  from  averages  across  all  age
groups  are likely  to be robust  to certain  types  of data error.  To increase
robustness  further,  growth  iates  have  been  calculated  only  for  countries  with
at least  three  censuses,  and  thus  two  sets  of intercensal  growth  rates,  since
the Second World War, and have been calculated  separately  for males and
females.  Patterns  of age  misreporting  that  are not constant  across  censuses
will thus tend to average out, and errors that are not constant  across
censuses  but  vary  by sex  will  appear  as systematic  deviations  between  male  and
female  patterns  of change.
The calculations  have been done as follows.  For each country,  sex and
intercensal  interval the age-specific  growth  rates  were calculated  for all
five-year  age  groups.  Each  growth  rate  was  assigned  to each  year  of the  five-
year time  period  during  which the  population  of the age group  at the later
census  was  born,  and the  reciprocal  of each  growth  rate  was assigned  to  each
year  of the  five-year  time  period  during  which  the  population  of the  age  group
at the first  census  was born.  When five-year  time periods  did not coincide
with  calendar  years,  growth  rates  were  assigned  to  portions  of  calendar  years,
depending  on the census  dates. Thus for example for the age group 40-44
enumerated  first  at  end-June  1958  and  second  at  end-September  1965,  the  growth
rate is ascribed  to the  time  period  exactly  40 to  45 years  before  the  second
enumeration  date, that is, October  1920 to September  1925 (in  practice, a
quarter  of the  growth  rate  was ascribed  to 1920,  and three  quarters  to 1925,
and a whole  value  for  each  year 1921 to 1924).  The reciprocal  of the growth
rate is  ascribed  to the time  period  exactly  40 to 45 years  before  the first
enumeration  date,  that is,  .'uly  1913  to  June 1918.  The  average  annual  growth
rate for  each  calendar  year is then  obtained,  and this  average  annual  series
is  used  as the  basis  for  the  second  iteration.  Once  the  changes  brought  about
by  further iterations  are very small, the process is stopped, and the
resulting  series  of S  values  are accepted.  The process  is repeated  for all
other  intercensal  intervals  available,  and  final  estimates  for  the  country  are
obtained  by averaging the 6  estimates  for each calendar  year from each
intercensal  interval.  A  measure  of  agreement  between  the  intercensal  intervals
is  obtained  by calculating  the  standard  deviation  for  each  calendar  year from
1900 to 1950,  and  adding  them  up.
Each 'country'  series  has  been further  averaged  into  a 'regional'  series
by simply  finding  the  average  deviation  across  the  countries  of a region  for
each calendar  year observed.  Each country  has equal weight in a region,
11regardless  of the  number  of  censuses  the  country  may  have  had. Thus  a country
with  only  three  censuses,  and  thus  two  sets  of  growth  rates  (the  minimum  used)
has the  same  weight  in  the  regional  results  as a  country  with seven  censuses,
and  thus  six  sets  of successive  growth  rates.  It  may  be noted in  passing  that
the  more diversity  there is in the dates of censuses  within  a region,  the
smoother  the sequence  of growth  rate differences  is likely  to look.  If all
censuses  are held on the.  same day in years  ending in zero, each five year
period  will  be represented  by a  horizontal  line,  and the  series  will not  look
smooth.
The average deviations  by calendar  year, sex and region, are shown
graphically  in Figure  1. The regions  that  have been used are South  America
(SAM),  Central  America and the Caribbean (CAC),  sub-Saharan  Africa (SSA),
Middle  East  and  North  Africa  (MENA),  South  Asia (SAS)  (including  Mauritius),
and East  and South-East  Asia (ESEA).  The  countries  included  in each region,
and the years of the census  age distributions  used, are shown in Appendix
Table  1.
At first glance,  all six regions  show superficially  similar  patterns.
Cohorts  born in the early part of the twentieth  century are larger than
expected, those born in the 1930's  and 1940's  appear to be smaller than
expected,  and  tbose  born in  the  1950's  appear  to  be average  or  slightly  larger
than  aver:ge.  Closer  examination  suggests  some different  patterns,  however.
SAM and CAC show remarkably  similar  patterns,  though  the fluctuations  are
larger in the second group. Cohorts  born around 1900 are large, decline
somewhat  to  around  1905,  rise  again  to a  peak around  1910,  remain  high until
declining  sharply  around  1920, recover  briefly in the late 1920's,  decline
very  sharply  through  the  1930's  to  a  minimum  around  1940,  then  rising  steadily
to the late  1950s.  Patterns  for  males  and females  are  practically  identical.
The  main features  are  large  cohorts  between  1900  and 1920,  and small  cohorts
between  1930  and  1950.
SAS  and  ESEA  also  have  very  similar  patterns.  The  saw-tooth  patterns  that
both show  up to 1930,  with  peaks  on  years  ending  in  zero  and troughs  on  years
ending  in five,  must  be a consequence  of age  or date  heaping 2. Since  the  age-
specific  growth  rate  calculations  are  unaffected  by  proportionately  unchanging
heaping  on terminal  digits  of age, the  observed  pattern is probably  due to
some  additional  heaping  on terminal  digits  of year of birth,  the  heaping  on
years  of  birth  ending  in  zero  being  greater  than  that  on  years  of  birth  ending
in five.  Changes  in the extent  of misreporting  from  census  to census  could
2  Age  heaping  is the  widely  observed  practice  of preferentially  reporting
ages that end in particular  digits,  generally  0 and 5, resulting in excess
numbers  (or 'heaps')  of people  appearing  as, for example,  age 40 relative  to
those  appearing  as age  39 or age  41.
12also  produce  a  saw-tooth  pattern.  The  remaining  features  show  cohorts  of  above
average  size  from  1910  to 1930,  cohorts  of  much  below  average  size  in  the  late
1930s  and  1940s,  and  then  generally  above  average  sized  cohorts  in  the  1950s.
Male and female  patterns  are similar  for  ESEA,  but show some differences  in
SAS,  particularly  from  1900  to  1940.  Since  the  sex  ratio  at birth  is  unlikely
to  change  much  over  time,  variations  in  S  by  sex  must  be  due  to  differences  by
sex in mortality,  migration  or age misreporting.  In the South  Asia region,
changes  in sex  differentials  of mortality  are  a likely  explanation.
SSA shows  a rather  simple  pattern,  with cohorts  of above average  size
from  the  early  part  of the  century,  followed  by cohorts  of below  average  size
for the 1940s  and early 1950s.  However,  the region  is represented  by only
three  countries,  and age reporting  is particularly  bad. The MENA region  has
larger  than expected  cohorts  born up to about  1915, smaller than expected
cohorts  from 1915 to 1925,  a recovery  to slightly  above normal  in the late
1920's,  much  below  average  sized  cohorts  through  the  1930s  and  1940s,  with a
return  to normality  in the  1950s.
Tentative  interpretations  of the  patterns  appearing  in Figure  1 are as
follows.  The  above  average  growth  rates  for  the  cohorts  born in the  1900s  may
reflect  relatively  large  birth cohorts  throughout  the developing  world,  or
they may  reflect the  substantial  mortality declines (in absolute, not
relative,  terms)  that  the  elderly  have  enjoyed  since  1950.  The small  cohorts
born in  the  late  1910s  and  early  1920s  in the  MENA  region  may reflect  reduced
fertility and  possibly  increased child  mortality associated with  the
disruption  caused  by the  First  World War. The small  cohorts  surviving  from
around  1920  in  SAM  and  CAC  may  reflect  the  high mortality  associated  with the
1919  influenza  epidemic,  though  individual  series  do not  show  a  clear  effect.
The  small  cohorts  from  the  1930s  in  SAM,  CAC  and  MENA  must  be associated  with
the Great  Depression,  and accounted  for either  by reduced fertility  or by
increased  child  mortality.  For all regions,  the largest  negative  deviations
from a smooth  age distribution  occur in the late 1930s  and early 1940s,  is
clearly  associated  with the  Second  World  War.  The  effect  is  particularly  sharp
in  ESEA,  reflecting  widespread  fighting  and  Japanese  occupation  in  many  of  the
countries,  though  whether fertility  fell or child  mortality  rose cannot  be
determined  from the age distribution.  It is interesting  to note that the
Second  World  War had a stronger  effe^t  on population  change  than the Great
Depression,  even in non-combatant  nations of sub-Saharan  Africa and the
Americas.  In  all  regions,  the  late  1940s  and  1950s  show  a return  to  normalcy,
with no surge of growth  except in the ESEA region.  However, it should  be
remembered that  rapid mortality decline at  ages high  enough to  have
substantial  mortality  rates  will  affect  comparisons  across  long  time  intervals
of 40 or 50  years.
13Even  though  some  of  these  interpretations  are  stretching  the  data,  and
may seem  a bit fanciful,  the  results  in Figure  1 show  beyond  doubt  that
demographic  rates  fluctuated  quite  substantially  in  the  developing  world  prior
to the  onset  of the  demographic  transition.  As was noted  earlier  in the
discussion  of  China, parity-specific  control of  fertility'  through
contraception  or  abortion  was  unusual  prior  to  the  demographic  transition.  In
such  circumstances,  changes  in  fertility  would  arise  from  changes  in  union
formation  (delayed  or accelerated  marriage),  spousal  separation  (possibly
associated  with fluctuations  in short-term  migration),  changes  in coital
frequency  (changes  in libido  or abstinence),  changes  in probabilities  of
conception  (associated  with  nutrition),  and  changes  in  foetal  loss  (induced  or
spontaneous).  Of  these,  only  union  formation  can  be  examined  with  the  sort  of
data  available  to  us,  though  analyses  by  Lee  (1981)  of  data  for  England  over
three  centuries  prior  to  the  demographic  transition  suggest  that  foetal  loss
played  an  important  role  in  fertility  fluctuations  consequent  upon  economic
changes.  On the mortality  side,  given  that  both  preventive  medicine  and
curative  medicine  reached  only smaUl proportions  of  the population,
fluctuations  would arise largely  from variations  in susceptibility  and
resistance,  in  both  of  which  nutrition  would  be  expected  to  play  a  key  role.
Case  Studies  of  the  DemograRhic  Impact  of  the  Great  Depression
In  order  to  progress  beyond  the  broad  indication  of  demographic  response
in  Figure  1,  and  the  fanciful  interpretations  given  above,  it  is  necessary  to
turn  to the cases  of the few countries  with adequate  registration  data
covering  the  relevant  period.  Relationships  between  demographic  indicators  and
growth  rate fluctuations  will be examined,  to help confirm  some of the
interpretations  given  above,  and  demographic  fluctuations  will  then  be  related
to  economic  indicators  as  well.  Three  such  countries  will  be  examined:  Chile,
Costa  Rica  and  Sri  Lanka.
Chile
The  birth  rate,  death  rate  and  infant  mortality  rate  for  Chile  from  1910
to  1950  (Mitchell;1983)  are  shown  in  Figure  2,  together  with  deviations  6  from
a  smooth  age  distribution  for  each  year  and  gross  domestic  product  at  constant
(1960)  prices.  Gross domestic  product  shows three substantial  downward
deviations,  one  around  1920,  one  in  the  early  1930s,  and  a  brief  deviation  in
1943  and  1944.  The  infant  mortality  rate  appears  to  be  above  trend  around  1920
and  again  in  the  mid-1930s,  but  shows  no  clear  deviation  from  trend  in  the
mid-1940s.  The  birth  rate  does  not  fluctuate  sharply  from  year  to  year  (except
I That  is,  practices  of  fertility  regulation  that  vary  with  the  number  of
children  already  born  to  a  couple,  as  opposed  to  practices  such  as  breastfeeding
that  regulate  fertility  after  every  birth  regardless  of  family  size.
14for  an implausibly  large  jump in  1928),  but  drops  from  a general  level  around
40 per thousand  prior  to 1930 to a general  level  in the low 30s  after  1930.
Around these  levels, 1918 and 1919 appear  to have been years of low  birth
rate,  1927 to 1929 (and  outstandingly  1928,  possibly  an error  in the  series)
years  of  high birth  rate,  and the  late  1940s  show  a modest  upturn.  The death
rate shows a similar  pattern  to that of the infant  mortality  rate,  with a
general  decline  over the  period  interrupted  by two  reversals,  around  1920  and
in the  mid- to late-1930s.  The fluctuations  implied  by age-specific  growth
rates  agree  closely  for  males  and females;  they  suggest  above  average  cohort
size from 1910  to 1915  and from 1925 to 1930,  and  below average  cohort  size
from  1935  to  1940,  and  to  some  extent  during  the  1940s  also.  These  growth  rate
fluctuations  agree  quite  closely  with the  fluctuations  around  a rising  trend
in the net birth rate, the birth rate multiplied  by the probability  of
surviving  to age  one,  over five  year periods.
A superficial  view  of  Figure  2  suggests  mortality  increases  following  the
GDP declines  around 1920 and in the early 1930s,  and a sharp decline in
fertility  (with  no subsequent  recovery)  at the  time  of the  1930s  GDP  decline.
Results  of a  regression  analysis  of detrended  values  of the  birth  rate,  death
rate  and infant  mortality  rate  on detrended  GDP  values  with lags of zero to
three  years  are shown  in  Table  2.  Though  the  amount  of  variance  accounted  for
by  the economic  variables  is small,  the relationships  found  have plausible
signs  and  lags.  The  crude  marriage  rate  and  the  birth  rate  are  both  positively
and  significantly  associated with current (unlagged) GDP, but  are  not
significantly  associated  with lagged  GDP (though  the  negative  sign for  a lag
of one year for  both marriages  and  births  suggests  some  bringing  forward  of
future  marriages  and  births  as a result  of good  times,  or  postponement  to the
next year as a result  of economic  bad times).  The association  of the  birth
rate with unlagged  GDP might be taken  as suggesting  a mechanism  operating
through  foetal  loss  rather  than  through  conception.  Both  the  crude  death  rate
and  the  infant  mortality  rate  are  negatively  and  significantly  associated  with
GDP  lagged  by two  years,  but  show  no  significant  association  at  other  lags.  No
mechanism  for  a lag  of two  years  springs  to  mind.
The  case  of  Chile  early  in  the  present  century  thus  supports  some  of the
earlier  conclusions  and speculations.  The deviations  of cohort sizes from
smooth expected sizes do follow fluctuations  in demographic  rates quite
closely.  The economic  reversals  that occurred  around  1920 and in the  early
1930s were associated  with substantial  demographic  responses,  notably an
immediate  decline  in  births  and  marriages,  and  by an increase  in  both infant
and  overall  mortality  two  years  later.  On the  basis  of  these  relationships,  an
increase  of GDP to 10 percent above trend would be  associated  with an
immediate  increase  in  the  birth  rate  of four  percent,  and  a decrease  two  years
15later  of 4.5 percent in the  death rate and of three percent in the infant
mortality  rate.
Costa  Rica
Figure  3 ihows  the  birth  rate,  death  rate  and  infant  mortality  rate for
the  years  1926  to  1950,  the  value  of  exports  and  imports  at  current  prices  for
the  years  1910  to 1946 (all  from  Mitchell,1983),  and  cohort  deviations  & from
expected  smooth  cohort  sizes for  periods  from 1910 to 1950,  for  Costa  Rica.
Unfortunately,  the  demographic  sequence  is  only available  from  1926,  because
of  a  major  discontinuity  in  the  sequence  of  numbers  of  births  between  1925  and
1926.
The  birth  rate  fluctuates  narrowly  in  the  mid to  upper  40s  from  the  late
1920s  to 1950,  the  values  in the  mid-1930s  being  slightly  below trend.  The
death  rate  appears  to fluctuate  around  23  per thousand  into  the  early  1930s,
Table  2. Relationships  Between  Detrended  Demographic  and  Economic  Variables;
Chile,  1910  to 1950
Demographic  Economic  Indicator
Indicator  GDP  GCD -1  GDP - 2  GDP - 3  Constant  R2
Birth  Rate  0.37  -0.19  0.20  0.09  0.52  0.10
(0.02) (0.24)  (0.23)  (0.55)
Death  Rate  -0.03  0.13  -0.45  0.16  1.20  0.21
(0.83) (0.37)  (0.00)  (0.24)
Crude
Marriage  Rate  0.74  -0.09  0.13  0.32  -0.09  0.21
(0.00) (0.73)  (0.64)  (0.20)
Infant
Mortality  Rate -0.16  0.17  -0.31  -0.04  1.35  0.10
(0.20)  (0.22)  (0.03)  (0.79)
Figures  in parentheses  below  coefficients  are P-values.  Figures  in  bold are
significant  at five  percent  level.
and  then starts  a decline  interrupted  by peaks in 1935  and 1942.  The infant
mortality rate appears to decline fairly steadily  throughout  the period,
though  with fluctuations  around the trend  and a sharp spike in 1942. The
estimates  of cohort  size  deviation  show  above  average  growth  around  1910,  and
below  average  growth  from the  early  1930s  to the  late  1940s,  but  very little
in the  way  of fluctuations  from  1915  to the  early  1930s.  Economic  conditions,
as  measured  imperfectly  by the  current  value  of  both  imports  and  exports,  show
strong  economic  performance  in the late 1920s and in the 1940s,  and weak
performance  in the  early  1920s  and  throughout  the 1930s.
The estimates  of demographic  performance  based on age specific  growth
rates  appear  to  follow  the  economic  indicator  quite  closely,  lagged  by two  or
three  years.  The demographic  indicators  based  on registration  data,  however,
show no apparent  relationship  either  to the economic  indicators  or to the
16demographic  indicator  based  on  age  distributions.  This  lack-of  relationships
is  confirmed  by regressing  the  birth  rate,  death  rate  and  infant  mortality
rate  on the imports  and exports  variable,  lagged  by zero  to three  years.
Regression  results  are shown  in Table 3. None of the coefficients  are
significant  at  a five  percent  level,  and  their  signs  are  often  implausible.
Thus  the  demographic  rates  based  on  vital  statistics  fail  to  show  any  short
Table  3.  Relationships  Between  Detrended  Demographic  and  Economic  Variables;
Costa  Rica,  1926  to  1950
Demographic  Economic  Indicator
Indicator  IMPEXP  IMPEXP-1  IMPEXP-2  IMPEXP-3  Constant  R2
Birth  Rate  0.03  -0.02  0.05  -0.01  0.94  0.14
(0.65)  (0.69)  (0.38)  (0.92)
Death  Rate  -0.67  0.12  0.59  -0.56  1.48  0.05
(0.13)  (0.63)  (0.08)  (0.13)
Crude
Marriage  Rate  0.19  0.10  -0.11  -0.03  0.86  0.23
(0.50) (0.54)  (0.63)  (0.91)
Infant
Mortality  Rate  -0.52  0.14  0.40  -0.41  1.36  0.00
(0.34) (0.67)  (0.33)  (0.38)
Figures  in  parentheses  below  coefficients  are  P-values.  Figures  in  bold  are
significant  at  five  percent  level.
term  relationship  between  demographic  and  economic  variables,  though  the  lack
of consistency  of such  demographic  rates  with  the  growth  rate  fluctuations
suggests  the  possibility  of  problems  with  the  vital  rates.
Sri  Lanka
Demographic  and economic  series  for Sri Lanka from 1926 to 1950
(Ceylon;1953)  are  shown  in  Figure  4, together  with  deviations  from  average
growth  rates  for  cohorts  born  from  1910  to  1950.  The  features  that  stand  out
from  Figure  4 are  a mortality  peak  for  both  the  death  rate  and  the  infant
mortality  rate  for  1935  and  a  sharp  mortality  decline  from  1946  to  1950.  The
birth  rate  trend  has  no  such  marked  features,  but  appears  to  decline  gradually
through  the early 1930s,  recovering  gradually  through  the 1940s.  The
deviations  5  from  a  smooth  age  distribution  show  little  change  from  the  1910s
to  the  early  1930s,  sharply  smaller  cohorts  from  the  late  1930s  and  early
1940s,  followed  by  a recovery  to  somewhat  above  expected  cohort  sizes  in  the
late  1940s.  The  economic  series,  of  export  volume  on  a  base  of  1934-38  equal
to  100,  shows  rapid  expansion  to  1929,  a  decline  through  most  of  the  1930s,
followed  by  a  strong  increase  through  the  1940s.
The  economic  series  and  the  growth  rate  series  show  a  similar  pattern  of
decline  througi  the  1930s,  followed  by  increase  through  the  1940s.  The  birth
17rate  series  shows  a rather  similar  pattern,  but the  two  mortality  series  show
no increase  in the  1930s  with the  exception  of the  sharp  mortality  spike  in
1935',  though  the declines  in the late 1940s  mirror  the improvement  in the
economic  indicator.  Thus no very clear  association  appears  in the short  run
between economic  change  and demographic  change,  though  the effective  birth
rate,  the  product  of the  birth rate and  the probability  of surviving  to age
one, is rather  similar  to the  economic  series  from  1930  onwards.  Regression
analysis  if the  detrended  demographic  rates  on detrended  export  volume  with
lags  from  zero  to  three  years  fails  to  identify strong  short-term
relationships.  None  of the  coefficients,  shown  in  Table  4,  are  significant  at
the  five  percent  level,  and  many of the  coefficients  are  of implausible  sign
(for  example,  all the coefficients  of export  volume  with annual  deaths  are
positive,  such that,  if export  volume is a reasonable  indicator  of economic
conditions,  better  economic  conditions  imply  more deaths).
Table  4. Relationships  Between  Detrended  Demographic  and  Economic  Variables;
Sri  Lanka,  1926 to  1950
Demographic  Economic  Indicator
Indicator  Ea  P_  EXP - 1  EXP  - 2  EXP - 3  Constant  RX
Birth  Rate  0.15  -0.37  0.27  -0.26  1.19  0.26
(0.36) (0.06)  (0.16)  (0.25)
Death  Rate  1.13  0.04  1.16  1.10  -2.33  0.00
(0.27) (0.97)  (0.29)  (0.40)
Infant
Mortality  Rate  0.65  -0.16  0.60  1.14  -1.15  0.00
(0.51) (0.87)  (0.57)  (0.38)
Figures  in parentheses  below coefficients  are P-values.  Figures in  bold are
significant  at five  percent  level.
As in  the  case  of Costa  Rica,  vital  registration  data for  Sri  Lanka  fail
to show any clear relationship  between  economic  fluctuations  and short-run
demographic  response.  Fluctuations  in  age-specific  growth  rates  do
indicate  a period  of low  growth  in  the  1930s,  probably  associated  mainly  with
a gradual  decline  in the  birth  rate  during  the  period,  assisted  by one sharp
upsurge  in infant  mortality.
I  The mortality  spike  in 1935  was attributed  by contemporary  observers  to
a malaria  epidemic  in that  year. The early 1930s  were characterized  by mass
unemployment  in  Sri  Lanka,  so  the  economic  effect  of  the  depression  was  probably
greater  than the export  sequence  suggests.  The mortality  decline in the late
I940s  coincided  with  the  introduction  of  public  assistance  payments  in  1946,  and
major  increases  in public  expenditures  on  health  from  1945.
18Pre.Industrial  Eniland
Extensive  analysis  has  beer  carried  out  of time  series  of demographic
measures  in  England  covering  the  period  from  the  16th  to  the  19th  centuries
(Wrigley  and  Schofield;  1981).  In  an  examination  of  short-tF  2 variations  in
vital  rates  and  prices,  Lee  (1981)  found  the  following  relationships  between
prices  and  vital  rates:
1. Grain  prices  were  positively  associated  with  mortality  over  two  or
three  years,  and  then  negatively  associated,  such  that  the  net  effect  over
five  years  was close  to  zero.  Price  variation  accounted  for  only  a small
proportion  of  the  variance  in  mortality,  but  the  association  was  none  the  less
very  significant.  The  peak  effect  of  a  price  change  was  delayed  by  two  years.
The  relationship  between  prices  and  mortality  weakened  into  the  18th  and  19th
centuries.
2. Grain  prices  were  negatively  associated  with  marital  fertility,  with
an  effect  beginning  with  a lag  of  only  about  three  months,  and  peaking  at  10
months.  Such  lags  suggest  that  foetal  loss  may  have  played  an  important  role.
A  positive  echo  is  found  after  24  months,  but  the  net  effect  over  five  years
is  still  strongly  negative.  The  relationship  remains  strong  over  all three
centuries.
3.  Grain  prices  are  negatively  associated  with  nuptiality,  the  effect
being  strongest  in  the  same  year.  The  effect  of  prices  on  fertility  through
nuptiality,  however,  appears  to  be  negligible.
*The  long  run  relations  between  economic  and  demographic  conditions  in
England  during  the period  may have been far from typical.  Wrigley  and
Schofield  (1981)  characterize  the accommodation  between  production  and
population  in  England  as 'a  fertility-dominated  low-pressure  system'  through
'wide,  quiet fluctuations  in fertility',  as opposed  to the 'mortality-
dominated  high-pressure  system'  through  'sudden,  sharp  mortality  spasms'  often
portrayed  as  the  norm.  Mortality  in  England  varied  little  in  the  medium  and
long  term  with  economic  changes;  such  mortality  'crises'  as  did  occur  arose
from 'independent  and unpredictable  visitations  of infectious  disease.'
Fertility,  on the other  hand, fluctuated  substintially  over the three
centuries,  and  these  fluctuations  'appear  to  have  borne  a  close  relation  to
secular  economic  trends'.  Over the longer  run, the fertility  reactions
resulted  from  the  operation  of  the  marriage  system  rather  than  through  control
of  marital  fertility.
Conclusions
A  number  of  studies  over  the  last  few  years  have  raised  the  prospect  of
substantial  increases  in  mortality  as  a result  of  the  structural  adjustment
policies  and resultant  economic  recession  in the  developing  world  in the
191980s.  Some  studies  have  failed  to  find  clear  evidence  of  such  increases  in
mortality  (or  reductions  in  the  pace  of  decline).  Hill  and  Pebley  (1989),  for
example,  examine  child  mortality  estimates  for  five-year  periods  for  those
countries  with  acceptable  data,  and  find  no  evidence  of  any  change  in  the  pace
of decline  of child  mortality.  They  note,  however,  that  contemporaneous
factors  such  as  child  _.urvival  programs  could  have  disguised  the  effect  of
economic  fluctuations  on  child  mortality.  Behrman  (1988)  finds  no  evidence  of
a relation  between  mortality  and  economic  factors  in  the  short  run,  and  finds
no  convincing  empirical  evidence  of  mechanisms  through  which  such  a  relation
would  exist.
A strategy  for  increasing  the  number  of  observations  over  that  available
for  the  very  recent  past  and  for  reducing  the  influence  of  confounding  factors
is  to  examine  the  historical  record  for  evidence  of  demographic  responses  to
economic  fluctuations.  Taucher  (1989),  using  data  for  Chile  from  the  late
1960s  to  the  late  1980s,  found  a  strong  relation  between  both  nuptiality  and
fertility  up to  and  including  third  births  and  economic  factors,  but  found
little  or no relation  between  such  factors  and  fertility  after  the third
child,  infant  mortality  or  adult  mortality.  However,  a  re-analysis  of  her  data
using  detrended  series  confirmed  the  relations  between  economic  change  and
fertility  (at  low  and  high  parities)  and  suggested  a  response,  lagged  by  one
year,  of  infant  mortality  also.
A review  of age  distributions  collected  over  the  last  four  decades  in
developing  countries  suggests  that  in  most  parts  of  the  world  (exceptions  are
East  Asia  and  sub-Saharan  Africa)  the  numbers  of  survivors  of  births  occurring
during  the  Great  Depression  in  the  1930s  are  below  the  numbers  to  be  expected.
Such  low numbers  of sur  'vors  could  have arisen  as a  result  of reduced
fertility  during  the  depre  sion,  or  of  increased  child  mortality.  The  numbers
of  survivors  of  births  in  the  1940s  are  small  for  all  regions.  An  examination
of three  countries  with  more  extensive  data  suggests  that  the  small  numbers
did  not in  general  arise  from  increases  in  mortality  (though  mortality  in
Chile  apparently  did  vary  with  economic  conditions,  lagged  by  two  years  (the
same  lag  as Lee  (1981)  found  between  mortality  and  grain  prices  in  England
three  centuries  earlier),  and  probably  arose  from  reductions  in fertility,
though  again  no  significant  relationships  could  be  found  betiween  fertility  and
lagged  economic  indicators  (again  with  the  exception  of  Chile,  where  fertility
apparently  reacted  to economic  change  in  the same  year,  similar  to Lee's
finding  for  England  of a fertility  response  to  grain  prices  starting  at a
three  months'  lag,  and  peaking  at  a  nine  or  ten  months'  lag;  the  'echo'  found
by  Lee  at 24  months  in  the  English  data  is  not  evident  in  the  Chilean  data
however).
The  lack  of  demographic  response  to  economic  change  prior  to  the  second
World  War  in  two  of  the  three  countries  studied  in  detail  may  be  due  in  part
20to  shortcomings  of  the  data.  The  age  distribution  evidence  for  a  large  number
of  countries  shows  without  doubt  that  some  sort  of  demograpsiic  disturbance
occurred  during  the  1930s,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  it  occurred  as
a  result  of  the  Great  Depression.  This  disturbance  may  have  had  both  fertility
and  mortality  components,  as  in  Chile,  but  in  general  the  fertility  component
appears  to  have  been  larger  than  the  mortality  component.  Such  a  finding  would
be in agreement  with Lee's conclusions  about economic  and demographic
relations  in  England  prior  to  the  industrial  revolution.
In  summary,  the  apparent  lack  of  response  of  mortality  to  the  economic
crisis  of the  1980s  may  not  be surprising.  The  historical  record  does  not
support  the  existence  of  strong  short-run  responses  of  mortality  to  economic
change,  and in some  cases  does  not  even  support  the existence  of strong
longer-term  relationships,  though  clearly  the  strong  cross-sectional  relation
now  evident  between  mortality  and  economic  status  must  have  arisen  through
some such long-term  relation.  The clearly-documented  cases of mortality
crises,  such  as  the  case  of  China  in  the  late  1950s,  have  been  associated  with
widespread  famine.  In  one  case  of  apparently  rising  mortality  in the  early
1980s,  that  of  Ghana,  famine  may  well  have  been  the  precipitating  factor  also.
Thus  economic  downturns  not  associated  with  famine  appear  to  have  little  short
term  impact  on mortality,  whereas  famines,  whether  associated  with  major
economic  downturns  or not, appear  to have large short-term  impacts  on
mortality.  The recent  evidence  for  such  a conclusion  is  bolstered  by the
historical  record  from  Europe.
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South  Amrica  Ar9entina  1960,  1970,  1980
Bazil  1950,  196%, 1970
Chile  1952,  1960,  1970
Qolaibia  1951,  1964,  1973
E  1950,  1962,  1974
Paraguay  1950,  1962,  1972
Peru  1961,  1972,  1981
Vejazueia  1950,  1961,  1970
Cntral  Amrica  and  Costa Rica  1950,  1963,  1973
Caribbean  Dominican  Repblic  1950,  1960,  1970
Guatmi.la  1950,  1964,  1973
wktdhras  19501  1961,  1974
J-aiuica  1953  ,  1960,  1970
4artitniqye  1954,  1961,  1967
Mexi'co  1950,  1960,  1970
Nicaragua  1950,  1963,  1971
Pnama  1950,  1960,  1970
Puerto  Rico  1950,  1960,  1970
Sub-Sabaran  Africa  Ghana  1960,  1970,  1984
Ynya  1962,  1969,  1979
YbMozaiiqj.ie  1950,  1960,  1970,  1980
North  Africa  and  Iraq  1957,  1965,  1977
Middle  East  Tunisia  1956,  1966,  1975
STurkey  1950,  1955,  1960,  1965,  1970
Scuth  Asia  Earq1adesh*  1951,  1961,  1974
Mburitius  1952,  1962,  1972
Pa)dstan***  1951,  1961,  1981
Sri  lanka  1953,  1963,  1971
So  th-East  Asia  China,  PeoP1e's  RAp 1953,  1964,  1981
Hbng Kcng  1961,  1971,  1976*
Forea,  PApublic  of  1955,  1960,  1966,  1970,  1975
Walasia,  Sabah  1951,  1960,  1970
Thi11ppines  1948,  1960,  1970
Ibal Uman  1960,  1970,  1980
*  Age disUrutin  derived  frm  large  sample  aurvey.
East  Pakistan  in  1951 ard  1961
***West Pakistan  in  1951 and  1961
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